Eavesdropping near-field contactless payments: a quantitative analysis

Eavesdropping near-field contactless payments: a quantitative analysis

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This paper presents an assessment of how successful an eavesdropping attack on a contactless payment transaction can be in terms of bit and frame error rates, using an easily concealable Tasting Spoons antenna and low-cost electronics.Potential success of an eavesdropping attack largely depends on the correct recovery of the data frames used in the ISO 14443 standard.A near-field communication inductive loop antenna was used to emulate an ISO 14443 transmission.

For eavesdropping, an identical inductive loop Hopper antenna as well as a shopping trolley modified to act like an antenna were used.The authors present and analyse frame error rates obtained with the authors equipment over a range of distances, up to 100 cm, well above the official maximum operating distance depending on the magnetic field strength.